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The debate between relationalism and representationalism in the philosophy of 
perception seems to have come to a standstill where opponents radically disagree on 
methodological principles or fundamental assumptions. According to Fish (this 
volume) this is because, not unlike Kuhnian scientific paradigms, the debate displays 
some elements of incommensurability. This diagnosis makes advancing the debate 
impossible. I argue that what is hindering progress is not a clash of research 
programmes, but a series of misunderstandings that can be avoided by disentangling 
the different questions each theory is invested in and by making explicit the hidden 
assumptions at play in the debate. One such central assumption is what I call 
the Superficiality Constraint. This is the idea that the phenomenal character of 
experience is superficial with respect to introspection. I argue that we can make 
progress in the debate by assessing to what extent and at what cost relationalism can 
accommodate this constraint. 
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1. The Debate on Relationalism 
One of the liveliest debates in the contemporary philosophy of perception concerns the 
way perception relates us to the world. The dominant alternatives in this debate are 
representationalism and relationalism. Representationalism, which has become 
something of an orthodoxy since the second half of the twentieth century, claims that 
perception has a representational content, capable of being veridical or illusory, which 
represents the way things appear to be to the subject. Relationalism denies that 
perception is (fundamentally) representational: instead, it is a non-representational 
relation of acquaintance with mind-independent objects. 
Much of this debate has focused on how the alternative views account for non-
veridical experiences, in particular hallucinations. For representationalists 
hallucinations are the same kind of experience we have when we perceive veridically: 
the only difference from veridical perceptions is that their content typically incorrectly 
represents how things are in the world. But for the relationalist, the kind of experience 
we have when veridically perceiving (the obtaining of a relation of acquaintance with 
mind-independent objects) is not one you can have when hallucinating, where the 
relevant objects are absent. Therefore, most relationalists embrace disjunctivism, the 
view that perception and hallucination differ in some important way. Proponents of 
disjunctivism disagree as to where exactly this difference lies. For reasons I will discuss 
later on, here I will focus on a version of disjunctivism, often called !phenomenal 
disjunctivism’"(Haddock and Macpherson 2008), which locates the difference between 
perception and hallucination in their respective phenomenal character. For simplicity, 
I will simply use the term !disjunctivism’ to refer to this particular claim. 
Disjunctivism has been met with strenuous resistance by many philosophers, for 
reasons that fall under two main lines of reasoning: 
 
 
(1) The very notion of phenomenal character entails that whenever two phenomenal 
characters are indistinguishable, they are qualitatively identical, as there is no seem/is 
distinction when it comes to phenomenal character. This idea goes often under the name 
of ‘the Indistinguishability Principle’ (Siewert 1998; Siegel 2008, 2004; Deutsch 2005; 
Kriegel 2013; Farkas 2006). 
(2) Disjunctivism is incompatible with vision science because the latter is committed 
to either of the following claims: 
(a) a visual state ‘causally depend[s] only on proximal stimulation, internal input, and 
antecedent psychological condition’ (Burge 2005, 22) (same cause same effect 
principle) (see also Smith 2008, 2002; Foster 2000; Sollberger 2007); 
(b) the phenomenal character of a visual state locally supervenes on the neural activity 
(Robinson 1994, 151–2).1 
Proponents of relationalism retort that both objections are ill-founded: 
(1) Nothing—either in the notion of phenomenal character or in what we know about 
how introspection works—forces us to accept the Indistinguishability Principle (Hinton 
1967b, 1967a; Martin 1997, 2003, 2006; Fish 2008, 2009). 
(2) Disjunctivism is not incompatible with science because: 
 (a) The ‘same cause same effect principle’ begs the question against relationalism, as 
it ‘rules out the possibility that relational states of affairs or events can form part of a 
causal nexus where relational states of affairs may differ purely in their distal elements’ 
(Martin 2006, 368); 
 
1  These two claims are distinct, as the local supervenience claim doesn’t entail causal 
dependence, but they are very similar inasmuch as they both rule out the possibility that 




(b) Local supervenience is only a working assumption concerning the relation between 
neural and mental states, and is not better supported by empirical data than competing 
models (Fish 2009, 117–44). 
Opponents of relationalism, in turn, insist on the validity of the principles they rely 
on or insist that, somehow, disjunctivism is ‘a bitter if not impossible pill to swallow’ 
(Knight 2013, 3). 
Each camp seems to think that the opponents grossly misunderstand their position, 
fail to see the inescapability of some principle (or, on the contrary, blindly accept 
principles that should not be taken for granted), or have an irreducibly different 
(possibly wrong-headed) way of thinking about the methods and purposes of 
philosophical reflection on perception. 
This fuels scepticism about the possibility of ever adjudicating on its own terms a 
debate which seems to rest on a disagreement over fundamental assumptions and 
methodological approaches. In a paper from 2005 and in his contribution to this 
volume, William Fish voices this sort of scepticism and likens the debate over 
disjunctivism to Kuhn’s incommensurable competing paradigms. 
In the next section I will argue that, despite Fish’s attempts to give it a positive 
spin, his diagnosis of the debate at hand leaves us without any way of adjudicating it 
(and possibly other philosophical debates). This outcome is certainly something most 
philosophers would like to avoid. 
The good news is that we do not have to be resigned to such defeatism. Contrary 
to Fish, I will argue that the current lack of progress in the debate is not due to an 
insurmountable structural feature of this debate but to the failure to make explicit and 
address an implicit assumption which motivates the widespread scepticism towards 
disjunctivism. In order to identify this implicit assumption, in section 3 I will start by 
surveying how the current debate originated from the attempt to reconcile two 
 
 
apparently incompatible, but equally compelling, intuitions about perception. This 
suggests that adjudicating the debate depends on assessing the respective costs and 
benefits of competing views and that, most likely, no solution will come without a 
certain price to pay. However, not every price is equal, and one of philosophy’s tasks 
is to guide us in weighing up which price is worth paying. 
In section 4 I will argue that the failure to address an implicit assumption that 
operates in the background of the debate has hindered the efforts to assess the real costs 
of accepting relationalism. The assumption is that there is a basic constraint to any 
meaningful account of phenomenal character, which I dub the ‘superficiality 
constraint’. This is the idea that the phenomenal character of experience is tied to 
introspection in a way that limits the pattern of possible introspective mistakes we can 
introspectively make about phenomenal character. In section 5 I will argue that the 
superficiality constraint is effectively embedded in the way the notion of phenomenal 
character is used in the debate, so all parties need to accept it. In section 6 I will 
formulate an argument against relationalism based on this assumption, and I will briefly 
discuss what relationalists could say to address it. This will shed a new light on the 
debate and offer a roadmap to advancing it: whether the cost of accepting relationalism 
is one that is worth paying will depend on how satisfactory their responses to the 
argument from superficiality are. 
2. Philosophical Disagreement and Incommensurable Paradigms 
In his contribution to this volume, Fish focuses on the heated dispute between Burge 
(2005) and McDowell (2011). He suggests that it ‘displays enough of the classic 
features of a clash of Kuhnian paradigms—just with philosophical theories, rather than 
scientific theories, playing the role of paradigms’ (Fish this volume: xx). 
 
 
According to Kuhn, science undergoes alternating phases of normal science and 
revolutions. In periods of normal science, there is only one prevailing scientific 
paradigm—a set of beliefs, instruments, metaphysical and methodological 
assumptions, and models to carry out scientific enquiries. When problematic 
experimental findings build up and the paradigm encounters increasing difficulties in 
solving the new puzzles that arise, science enters a phase of revolution, where 
competing paradigms might emerge. The competing paradigms are, according to Kuhn, 
incommensurable: there is no objective way (i.e. neutral with respect to the assumptions 
and methods of each paradigm) of comparing and evaluating them. 
Fish notices elements of incommensurability in the debate between Burge and 
McDowell, inasmuch as ‘each finds different ways of speaking to be “natural”, and 
attempts to translate between the two “languages” are fraught with difficulty and the 
potential for misunderstanding’ (Fish this volume)2 and each has their own distinctive 
‘list of problems that any candidate for paradigm must resolve’ (Kuhn 1962, 148, 
 
2  An example of this is McDowell’s understanding of veridical perception in terms of a 
subject’s ‘openness to the layout of reality’ (McDowell 1994, 26. Quoted by Fish this 
volume xx), an expression that reveals his commitment to disjunctivism (if veridical 
perception is openness to the reality, hallucination is something else completely, which 
offers the mere appearance of such openness). While he finds this idea ‘completely natural 
and intuitive’ (2010, 245), Burge finds it rather unintuitive and confusing—nothing more 
than a misplaced metaphor—and is keen to translate it into his own non-disjunctivist 
vocabulary: an experience is ‘open to the layout of reality’ if its content is true and it thereby 
accurately represents the world (Burge 2005, 3. See Fish this volume xx). 
 
 
quoted in Fish this volume). 3  Because of this incommensurability—Fish argues—
competing philosophical views, much like Kuhnian competing scientific paradigms, 
cannot do anything to convince the opponent. Any argument to this effect will 
inevitably rely on the assumptions associated with one paradigm, and thus seem 
compelling only to those who already accept them, but will fail to persuade the 
opponents who reject those assumptions. 
While Fish sees elements of incommensurability in the philosophical debate on 
perception, he is also aware of the limitations of comparing philosophical disputes to 
Kuhn’s scientific paradigms. The most notable difference he sees lies in the mostly 
diachronic nature of the Kuhnian model. For Kuhn, it is only in periods of ‘crisis’ that 
paradigms coexist, while in times of ‘normal science’ all research happens within a 
single prevailing paradigm. This doesn’t seem to be the case in philosophy, where 
competing theories are the norm rather than an exception. This leads him to turn to the 
work of another philosopher of science, Lakatos, whose competing research 
 
3 According to Fish, McDowell and Burge disagree on whether a philosophical account of 
perception should be constrained by epistemological considerations on how perception 
makes knowledge of the world available: McDowell’s account is primarily driven by those, 
while Burge doesn’t think an account of perception should be constrained by them. They 
also disagree, Fish claims, on what philosophy and science have to say respectively about 
consciousness. For McDowell a central task of a philosophical theory of perception to 
explain consciousness. For Burge consciousness is ‘almost surely […] not an essential 
feature of all perception’ (Burge 2011, 79, quoted by Fish, this volume) therefore it should 
not be the primary concern of the philosophical investigation of perception. As a result, 




programmes bear some resemblance to Kuhn’s  paradigms. For Lakatos, a research 
programme is successful if the successive changes to the peripheral claims of the theory 
made to accommodate new data yields novel predictions and some of these predictions 
are corroborated. Thus, for Lakatos, competing paradigms are not incommensurable, 
but they can be evaluated only with the benefit of hindsight. 
While this seems more optimistic than suggesting that competing philosophical 
views of perception are incommensurable, applying Lakatos’s model of scientific 
progress to philosophy might prove difficult. As Fish himself notices, philosophy 
doesn’t always yield testable predictions in the same way that science does, and while 
some philosophers (Fish mentions for instance Dennett) conceive of their theories as 
yielding predictions, many philosophers would emphatically deny that philosophy 
should do such a thing. Most importantly, even if we accept that at least some 
philosophical theories yield predictions, ‘there may well not yet be any non-contentious 
way to test those predictions’ (Fish, this volume: xx). Even if there was a way to derive 
predictions from philosophical theories and test them, ‘philosophers themselves—
happiest, as they are, in more conceptual spaces—may neither be best placed nor 
particularly inclined’ to do so (Fish, this volume: xx). It will be up to scientists to derive 
predictions from philosophical theories, test them, and report back to philosophers 
which one of the views they have debated is more successful. Not many philosophers 
would like to think that deferring to science is ultimately the only way to vindicate their 
philosophical view. 
Whichever way you look at it, Fish’s diagnosis of the state of the philosophical 
debate about perception is disheartening. If we embrace the Kuhnian model, advancing 
the debate is structurally impossible. If we opt for Lakatos’s model, it will be 
practically impossible to do so, at least within the realm of philosophy alone. But we 
 
 
needn’t adopt such a defeatist diagnosis. I will argue that a more promising route 
forward is available. If we divide the overall debate into ‘sub-debates’, we may well 
find that what is hindering progress is not a clash of research programmes, but a series 
of misunderstandings that might be avoided if philosophers were more careful about 
disentangling the different questions they are invested in. 
Some misunderstandings originate in the way the stand-off between relationalism 
and representationalism is often framed in terms of a disagreement about ‘the essential 
metaphysical structure’ (Genone 2016), or ‘the most fundamental characterization’ 
(Brewer 2011, 94) of perception. This is problematic, because philosophers often have 
different views about precisely what is essential or fundamental to perceptual 
experiences. For some, this is whatever accounts for the conscious aspect of 
perception—that is, its phenomenal character. For others, it’s whatever explains how 
perception generates knowledge of the world, or justifies beliefs about it, or motivates 
and prompts behaviours. For yet others, a fundamental characterization is one that 
explains all these phenomenological, epistemological, and behavioural explanations at 
once. This lack of clarity offers, as Fish remarks, ample opportunities for 
misunderstanding and disagreement. 
But we can go past the unhelpful language often used to frame the debate and avoid 
talking past each other by making sure we understand the restricted aim of each 
proposal. Interestingly, most relationalists have made it quite clear that they are 
primarily concerned with offering an account of the phenomenal character of 
perception. They think that the non-representational relation plays a fundamental role 
in explaining the phenomenal character of perception, which is partly constituted by 
 
 
the mind-independent objects one perceives.4 As such, they oppose representationalism 
to the extent that it claims that the representational content of experience can explain 
the phenomenal character of experience.5 
In what follows, I will focus on this more confined debate about the phenomenal 
character of perception. Here, the scope for disagreement about which questions are 
worth asking is significantly reduced, and it becomes possible to see how we can 





4 Martin (1997, 2002, 2003, 2006), Brewer (2008, 2011), Fish (2008, 2009), Soteriou (2013, 
2016), and Campbell (2002), for instance, all frame relationalism as (primarily) offering an 
account of the phenomenal character of perception. 
5 This leaves it open that relationalism (understood as an account of phenomenal character) 
might be compatible with allowing some other explanatory role (e.g. accounting for how 
perception brings about and motivates beliefs and actions) for the representational content 
of perception. It should also be noted that representationalism and relationalism are not the 
only options in this debate. Sense-data theorists claim that perception consists in a direct 
relation to immaterial objects called sense-data (Moore 1903; Russell 1912; Broad 1925; 
Price 1932; Robinson 1994; Foster 2000). Another family of theories includes views that 
account for the phenomenal character of perception in terms of ways of perceiving 
(adverbialism: see Ducasse 1942; Tye 1975, 1984; Coates 2007); for some of these views, 
the phenomenal character is determined by intrinsic properties of the experience (the qualia 
or mental paint view: see Chalmers 1996, 2004; Block 1996, 2003, 2010). 
 
 
3. Perception, Hallucinations, and Bullets to Bite 
One of the most effective ways of presenting what motivates the recalcitrant 
disagreement between relationalists and their opponents is offered by Valberg (1992). 
According to Valberg, at the heart of the debate in philosophy of perception lies an 
antinomy between two equally reasonable attitudes towards perception. If we are ‘open 
to our experience’ and how it strikes us through introspection, we are led to think of 
experience as a relation of awareness with mind-independent objects, as per 
relationalism. On the other hand, however, reflection on the possibility of (certain kinds 
of) hallucinations compels us to deny that perception amounts to a relation to the mind-
independent objects that we ordinarily take ourselves to be perceiving. For Valberg, 
these two attitudes form an antinomy: they are equally compelling, but mutually 
incompatible, ways of thinking about perception. Once this antinomy becomes 
manifest, one can either ‘demonstrate that the conflict in which it consists is merely 
apparent’ (Valberg 1992, 42) or accept it and explain why it ‘really is a conflict’ 
(Valberg 1992, 42). Disjunctivists go for the first option: they stick to the relationalist 
intuition and argue that there is a fallacy (or several) in the argument from hallucination. 
Opponents of disjunctivism might well agree that relationalism would be preferable, 
but they contend that such an option is simply not available, because the argument from 
hallucination offers a reductio ad absurdum of relationalism. 
The argument originates from noticing that we can have hallucinations—i.e. 
experiences that seem to relate us to mind-independent objects in the absence of any 
suitable object and arguing that, because we are often unable to tell them apart from 
veridical perceptions, the same non-relational account that applies to hallucination must 
be true for perception too. From here, it has developed into many versions, roughly 
 
 
corresponding to subsequent refinements in response to the relationalist’s responses to 
it. 
Disjunctivism arises from the relationalist’s attempt to reconcile their view with 
the possibility of hallucinations: there is no need—they claim—to accept that 
perception doesn’t involve a relation to a mind-independent object just because 
hallucinations don’t, and sometimes we take one mistake for the other (see Austin 1962; 
Hinton 1967). Proponents of the argument from hallucination bring to our attention new 
counterexamples and thought experiments to challenge this move. Recent discussions 
have focused on the following thought experiment. Suppose you see a lemon in front 
of you. Then the lemon is removed, while a scientist activates, through transcranial 
stimulation, exactly the same areas of the brain that were firing when you were seeing 
the lemon. You now have a hallucinatory experience as of a lemon which is 
indistinguishable from the veridical perception of the lemon, but in this case the 
experience is brought about only by the firing of certain neurons, while there is no 
lemon in front of you. It is more difficult for the relationalist to deny that a hallucination 
which is both indistinguishable from a given perception and caused by the same brain 
activity deserves the same account as a veridical perception. 
The back and forth of this debate is characteristic of what Casati (2011) calls 
‘conceptual negotiation’, a practice that he deems to be at the heart of any philosophical 
activity. According to Casati, the main aim of conceptual negotiation is to evaluate 
costs and benefits of competing views, by unpacking implicit assumptions in 
descriptions, theories, and arguments, and exploring their unexpected consequences. 
The need for conceptual negotiation arises—Casati claims—when we encounter a 
tension between competing intuitions. Such a tension often follows the discovery of 
new facts, either through scientific discoveries, changes in our society, or simply by 
 
 
new facts being brought to our attention. In our case, the tension arises from the 
realization that hallucinations are possible, and that this challenges the relationalist 
intuition. 
Valberg’s antinomy suggests that taking any position in this debate comes at a cost. 
Part of the job of conceptual negotiation is to assess how big of a bullet one has to bite 
when embracing a view. However, as Casati points out, the final decision as to which 
bullet to bite is extra-philosophical. At some point, philosophy’s job of unpacking the 
respective costs of competing views comes to an end, and people will still disagree on 
whether a certain price is worth paying. Here Casati echoes Lewis: 
Whether or not it would be nice to knock disagreeing philosophers down 
by sheer force of argument, it cannot be done. Philosophical theories are 
never refuted conclusively. (Or hardly ever. Gödel and Gettier may have 
done it.) The theory survives its refutation—at a price. Argle has said 
what we accomplish in philosophical argument: we measure the price. 
Perhaps that is something we can settle more or less conclusively. But 
when all is said and done, and all the tricky arguments and distinctions 
and counterexamples have been discovered, presumably we will still 
face the question which prices are worth paying, which theories are on 
balance credible, which are the unacceptably counterintuitive 
consequences and which are the acceptably counterintuitive ones. On 
this question we may still differ. And if all is indeed said and done, there 
will be no hope of discovering still further arguments to settle our 
differences. (Lewis 1983, x–xi) 
Has the debate on relationalism reached the point where, as Lewis says, all has been 
said and done and there’s no hope to settle our differences? I will argue that this is not 
 
 
the case. There is still a lot to do to fully assess the costs and benefits of relationalism. 
The deep-seated scepticism with which disjunctivism is often met suggests that some 
hidden assumption is at play in the debate. In the next section I will briefly outline what 
this implicit assumption is and how it can be used to mount a further argument against 
relationalism, which promises to highlight the true cost of embracing it. The assumption 
in question—implicit in the very notion of phenomenal character—is the idea that the 
phenomenal character of experience is superficial with respect to introspection. For this 
reason, I dub the ensuing argument ‘the argument from superficiality’. 
Like the argument from hallucination, the argument from superficiality focuses on 
the possibility of hallucinations and takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum. If Lewis 
is right, we should not expect any argument (including reductiones) to conclusively 
refute a theory (despite what some proponents of the argument from hallucination 
purport). What reductiones show is that a theory is incompatible with certain allegedly 
compelling claims. However, reductiones can be more or less persuasive—their 
persuasive force being conditional to finding the premises of the argument more 
convincing than the claim to be rejected, in this case relationalism. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, relationalists contend that the 
premises used in the various versions of the argument from hallucination beg the 
question against naive realism, and are less compelling than the intuition relationalism 
seeks to accommodate—if not downright false. I will argue that the argument from 
superficiality relies on premises that relationalists cannot easily dismiss as question 
begging and that are prima facie at least as compelling as the relationalist intuitions. 
With this argument in place, we can then examine whether relationalists can 
accommodate its premises and at what costs, and what would they lose if they fail or 
refuse to accommodate them. In other words, by considering what relationalists can say 
 
 
in response to the argument, we can better understand the true costs of accepting 
relationalism. Depending on the results, this may either reveal that the cost to be paid 
is higher than relationalists had so far realized, or finally appease some of the worries 
of the opponents. 
Because this paper focuses on the scope and methodology of the philosophy of 
perception, I won’t attempt any detailed evaluation of the argument or discussion of 
what relationalists could say in response to it. The aim of this paper is not to establish 
whether the merits of relationalism exceed its costs. Rather, it is to show that there is 
scope for progress in the debate, and in what direction we should move in order to 
achieve it. 
4. Phenomenal Character and Introspection 
The recent debate has focused on versions of the argument from hallucination that make 
use of the ‘same cause, same effect’ principle or the principle of local supervenience 
and pivot around a thought experiment presented above, featuring hallucinations that 
are brought about by the same brain activity involved in perception. 
However, I think we can learn something important and advance the debate if we 
temporarily leave aside the later instantiations of the argument from hallucination and 
we focus on understanding what lies at the root of the original argument from 
hallucination and the Indistinguishability Principle (the idea that if two experiences are 
introspectively indistinguishable through introspection, they must have the same 
phenomenal character). 
Proponents of the Indistinguishability Principle are motivated by certain 
assumptions about introspection and its link to the phenomenal character of perception. 
Many think that, while introspection is generally fallible, it is infallible when it comes 
 
 
to the access it offers to the phenomenal character of experience (see Farkas 2006; 
Gertler 2012; Giustina and Kriegel 2017). 
This claim of restricted infallibility is highly contentious6 and vehemently rejected 
by relationalists.7  While I share these reservations towards the Indistinguishability 
Principle and the idea of local introspective infallibility, I think that the thought that 
there is a special link between phenomenal character and introspection which 
disjunctivism makes difficult to accommodate deserves further examination. The 
problem is that this thought has so far been mischaracterized by the opponents of 
relationalism, steering the debate in an unfruitful direction. In what follows I will seek 
to offer a more accurate characterization of this link and examine what constraints it 
puts on any account of phenomenal character and how this may put pressure on 
disjunctivism. 
‘Phenomenal character’ is a term of art introduced to focus on what it is like to 
have an experience, among all the other aspects of perception we may be interested in 
(its functional role, its object, its causal history, its representational content, if any). In 
turn, what it is like to have an experience is often specified in terms of what is manifest 
to the experiencer through introspection. 
Thus, the role the term ‘phenomenal character’ is designed to fulfil in the current 
philosophical jargon implies that it is inextricably intertwined with the notion of 
phenomenal character. This is not to say that the phenomenal character of experience 
 
6 See Schwitzgebel 2008, 2012; Churchland 1984; Bayne and Spener 2010; Shoemaker 1996 
for various arguments (coming from very different perspectives, none of which presupposes 
relationalism) against this restricted version of introspective infallibility. 
7 See Hinton 1967; Martin 1997, 2003, 2006; Fish 2009. 
 
 
metaphysically depends on introspection: that would be a controversial commitment 
about its nature that most philosophers would reject. 8  Yet ‘direct introspective 
ostension’ (Kriegel 2015, 47) seems to be the only way to fix the reference for 
‘phenomenal character’.9 
This explains why it is so tempting for many to accept (more or less explicitly) the 
Indistinguishability Principle and dismiss disjunctivism as utterly unbelievable or 
confused. If an appeal to introspection is part of the descriptor that fixes the reference 
for ‘phenomenal character’, then introspection is the ultimate authority for knowing 
what the phenomenal character of an experience is: whatever the phenomenal character 
an experience seems to have through introspection is the phenomenal character the 
experience has, because there is nothing else to the phenomenal character of an 
experience than what appears through introspection. Or so the reasoning goes. 
But this is a non sequitur. If we want to assess whether disjunctivism is a viable 
option, we need to tease apart which constraints are simply part of the function we have 
assigned to the notion of ‘phenomenal character’ from further controversial 
commitments about consciousness, perception, introspection, and so on, which might 
 
8 Some see higher-order theories of consciousness (Lycan 1987, 2001; Rosenthal 2000, 2005a, 
2005b; Carruthers 2004) as committed to this metaphysical dependence. However, most 
accounts construe introspection as an activity that involves attention and the deployment of 
higher-order concepts, they maintain that phenomenal consciousness does not require these 
higher-order capacities (as creatures devoid of them, or humans that are inattentive or 
cognitively impaired, possess phenomenally conscious experiences). 
9 As Block (1978) famously notes, when asked to define phenomenal consciousness, a natural 
response is to answer as Louis Armstrong did when asked to define jazz: ‘if you have to ask, 
ain’t never gonna know.’ 
 
 
be surreptitiously built into it. Offering an informative yet neutral characterization of 
the link between introspection and phenomenal character is a delicate exercise of 
conceptual negotiation that I can’t hope to settle once and for all here. But I will propose 
an initial approximation and open up the negotiations. 
I find that the best way to begin is to focus on the function the notion of 
phenomenal character is designed to fulfil (that of singling out certain aspects of 
experience from others, on the basis of their privileged relation to introspection) and to 
compare it with another notion, which plays a similar role—that of contrasting a 
definite class of properties from others on the basis of their privileged relation to a 
source of information. The notion I have in mind is that of ‘observational properties’, 
used to refer to those properties (such as colour, taste, odours, sound, shape, size) that 
are thought to bear a special relation to perception. This is in contrast to properties 
which can also be seen but do not seem to be linked to perception in the same special 
way, such as natural kinds (being a lemon), artefactual kinds (being a chair), or causal-
historical properties (being fresh).10 
 
10 There isn’t consensus about what properties count as observational (for instance, some would 
claim that colours count but shapes don’t), or even whether there is any property which is 
truly observational. This is irrelevant for my present purposes. All is needed for the present 
purposes is to accept that there is a meaningful distinction to be drawn between observational 
and non-observational properties and if one were to maintain that either colour, smell, shape, 
or size were observational, the best way to account for observationality is in terms of their 
being superficial with respect to perception. 
I also don’t need to take a stance on whether we (directly) perceive natural kinds, artefactual 
kinds, and so on, often referred to as higher-level properties. As I understand it, the question 




Similarly to what happens with the notion of phenomenal character, often 
philosophers either fail to specify the nature of observational properties’ relation to 
perception or give clearly inadequate characterizations, yet assume as obvious the 
existence of a special connection of some sort with perception.11 However, the notion 
 
to whether higher-level properties can be directly perceived. We would not be able to ask 
that question if we didn’t have the intuition that some properties (what I refer to here as 
observational properties and what are referred to as ‘low-level properties’ in the context of 
the debate on what can be directly perceived) are more intimately linked to perception than 
others—as testified by the fact that we take for granted that they are directly perceived while 
we consider it an open question whether higher-level properties are directly perceived. 
We can understand those who deny that we can perceive higher-level properties (e.g. Byrne 
2009; Price 2009; Brogaard 2013) as offering a simple explanation of the intuitive distinction 
between observational and higher-level properties: for them what distinguishes 
observational properties is that they can feature in perception. However, even proponents of 
the claim that we can perceive higher-level properties (e.g. Bayne 2009; Siegel 2006, 2009; 
Nanay 2011a, 2011b) can maintain that there is a distinction: what they will need is an 
alternative explanation for this distinction which is not simply in terms of what can and 
cannot be directly perceived. What I offer here can be seen as an attempt to clarify what is 
special about observational properties which remains neutral with respect to the debate on 
what type of properties feature in perception. Thanks to Heather Logue for pointing out the 
need to clarify this. 
11 Here is an example of inadequate characterization: ‘Properties are observational in so far as 
they are presented or represented in perceptual experience. Properties are represented in 
experience by means of appearances. Thus we can say that observational properties are those 




of ‘observational properties’ is less elusive than that of ‘phenomenal character’, and we 
can rely on the fact that the relation between perception and observational properties 
has been more broadly examined. Thus, we can hope to learn some lessons about the 
phenomenal character of perception by first looking at the relatively more manageable 
literature on observational properties. 
Peacocke (1983) notices that observational and non-observational concepts (such 
as, for instance, concepts of natural kind properties) have a specific pattern of epistemic 
possibilities. It is possible for something to look like a tomato from all the different 
angles it may be seen, by a subject whose perceptual mechanism works properly and 
has the relevant concept of being a tomato, and yet it not be a tomato, but, say, a fake 
plastic tomato or even a synthetic replica of tomato produced by Kraft laboratories. On 
the other hand, something cannot seem to a subject with good sight and no relevant 
cognitive deficiency to be consistently yellow across time, under changing lighting 
conditions which include optimal ones, without actually being yellow (see Peacocke 
1983, 99).12 
If we fail to see that an object is a fake tomato rather than a real tomato, it might 
be our perception’s fault (maybe our vision is blurry and we can’t tell that the plastic 
 
characterization is inadequate because it is too inclusive: objects can appear to have all sorts 
of properties, not just observational properties such as colours and tastes. An object can 
appear to be a lemon, stale, or lonely. We can see his characterization of observationality as 
assuming that we can’t perceive higher-level properties. Or else we lose the ability to 
distinguish between observational and non-observational properties, because any property 
that we can perceive would count as observational. 
12 Peacocke focuses on observational concepts, but it is plausible to assume that observational 
concepts refer to classes of properties to which the epistemic constraint he identifies applies. 
 
 
tomato out of a child’s grocery shop set is a fake tomato). But it’s also possible that the 
fault doesn’t lie with perception: in the case of the synthetic fake tomato, for instance, 
there is no perceivable difference between the real and the fake tomato. The difference 
is hidden to perception: it lies in their respective chemical composition. It can only be 
discovered by non-perceptual means of investigation. In the case of redness, if 
something appears red but is not red, this can only be because something is wrong with 
either the conditions of observation or the perceptual mechanism, not because the 
difference between real red and ‘fake red’ is hidden to perception. An effective 
metaphor often used to characterize this distinction is in terms of superficiality. A 
property like redness is superficial in the sense that we can know that it’s instantiated 
by something on the basis of perception alone. 
5. The Superficiality Constraint 
This metaphor of superficiality and the related notion of epistemic possibilities are 
useful for understanding what constraint applies to an account of the relation between 
phenomenal character and introspection. Remember that the task at hand is to 
characterize the intuitive link between introspection and phenomenal character in a way 
which is informative, yet neutral with respect to controversial commitments. 
Philosophers have tried to characterize it with various notions, such as infallibility, 
certainty, incorrigibility, or luminosity. But these are all controversial. 
The idea that the phenomenal character is superficial with respect to introspection 
in the same way observational properties are superficial with respect to perception is 
weaker than any of these alternatives, yet it is informative, inasmuch as it grasps the 
intuitive distinction between, on one hand, phenomenal character and, on the other 
 
 
hand, other aspects of our mental life that may be introspected, but do not bear the same 
deep link to introspection. 
We often know through introspection alone what mental kinds we instantiate: we 
can reflect on our experience and judge that we are undergoing a perceptual experience, 
or an episode of recollection, or that we feel certain emotions. However, in some cases, 
whether we are in one kind of mental state as opposed to another is something that goes 
beyond the scope of introspection. For example, introspection doesn’t offer any clue as 
to whether the experience is a veridical perception or a hallucination that is subjectively 
indistinguishable from it. The only way to adjudicate that is to assess how the 
experience is brought about. 
On the other hand, it doesn’t seem possible for a difference in phenomenal 
character to go beyond the scope of what is accessible through introspection and only 
be discoverable through non-introspective enquiries. To put it in terms similar to those 
used by Peacocke with respect to observational properties, while introspective mistakes 
are possible (for instance because one doesn’t pay enough attention or because one’s 
introspective capacities don’t work properly), the pattern of possible mistakes is 
constrained by the following rule, which I call ‘the Superficiality Constraint’: 
(SC): It is not possible that an experience seems through introspection to have 
a certain type of phenomenal character, while it doesn’t actually have that 
phenomenal character, and there is no disabling or interfering condition in place 
that prevents one from introspectively realizing that the experience doesn’t, in 
fact, have that type of phenomenal character. 
The Superficiality Constraint is a very minimal claim. It is an epistemic constraint that 
merely restricts the pattern of possible mistakes about the phenomenal character of 
experience and remains neutral with respect to various commitments about the nature 
 
 
of introspection, phenomenal character, perception, and consciousness. As such, it is 
prima facie compatible with disjunctivism and cannot be said to beg the question 
against it. 
To appreciate how the Superficiality Constraint is indeed very modest and neutral, 
it is useful to contrast it with two other claims in its vicinity: (a) revelation and (b) 
luminosity. 
(a) Revelation was introduced by Johnston as an alleged feature of our common-
sense understanding of colour: 
(R): ‘the essential nature of (for example) canary yellow is fully revealed 
by visual experiences as of canary yellow things.’ (Johnston 1992, 138) 
It might be tempting to think that the Superficiality Constraint is akin to Revelation for 
the phenomenal character of experience. But this would be a mistake. While revelation 
is about the essential nature of a colour, that which makes a colour the property it is and 
not something else, the Superficiality Constraint is not about essential properties: it 
remains silent with respect to the nature of phenomenal characters. It is not about what 
makes the phenomenal character what it is rather than something else: it more modestly 
dictates the conditions under which an experience may seem to have a phenomenal 
character it does not have (whatever makes the phenomenal character what it is). 
 
(b) Luminosity is a thesis about mental occurrences that Williamson (2000) defines 
as follows: 
‘(L) For every case α, if in α [the mental occurrence] C obtains , then in α one 
is in a position to know that C obtains’ (Williamson 2000: 95). 
While mental occurrences such as pain and bodily sensations are often thought to be 
luminous, Williamson famously argues that no mental state is luminous. By allowing 
 
 
that there might be interfering conditions that impair one’s introspective capacities, the 
Superficiality Constraint is weaker than luminosity. If disabling or interfering 
conditions are in place, one may not be in a position to know that an experience with a 
certain phenomenal character obtains, although it remains true that the phenomenal 
character is superficial, because the fact that a certain phenomenal character is present 
could in principle be detected (where the interfering or disabling conditions are not in 
place) through introspection alone. 
Once we have distinguished the Superficiality Constraint from Revelation and 
Luminosity, we can more easily see in what respects the Superficiality Constraint is 
minimally committal and, as such, ‘relationalist-friendly’: 
(a) Unlike Luminosity—and unlike the Indistinguishability Principle, the principle 
of Same Cause, Same Effect and Local Supervenience used in the arguments 
from hallucination—the Superficiality Constraint is compatible with the 
disjunctivist commitment: due to the possibility of interfering and disabling 
conditions, it allows for hallucinations to seem to have a (relationalist) 
phenomenal character that they in fact lack. 
(b) Unlike Revelation, the Superficiality Constraint doesn’t commit to the idea that 
introspection fully reveals the nature of a phenomenal character. This fits very 
well with what relationalists are likely to say about the phenomenal character 
of both perception and hallucination. They clearly want to avoid the idea that 
the nature of the phenomenal character of hallucination is fully revealed by 
introspection. And while they are likely to think that there is some introspective 
support for their claims about the phenomenal character of veridical perception, 
 
 
they are likely to think that additional extra-introspective considerations are 
required to support their view.13 
As we have seen in the previous section, the idea of a special link between 
introspection and phenomenal character is part and parcel of the notion of phenomenal 
character. Denying such a link would be tantamount to refusing to use ‘phenomenal 
character’ in the way it is arguably designed to be used when introduced—i.e. to refer 
to that aspect of experience that bears a special connection to introspection. If one were 
to deny the existence of such a connection, one would not simply embrace a 
controversial explanation of what the phenomenal character of perception is, one would 
use the locution ‘phenomenal character’ in a way that changes the explanandum, and 
fails to refer to what everybody else in the debate means by it. 
The idea that some special link exists between introspection and the phenomenal 
character of perception is what has more or less implicitly motivated the widespread 
resistance towards relationalism. However, opponents so far have failed to identify the 
specific nature of this link, which hindered any progress in assessing whether or not 
there is some tension between how we think of phenomenal character and 
disjunctivism. With the notion of the Superficiality Constraint on hand, we can now 





13 An example of argument which heavily relies on extra-introspective considerations is the 
argument from transparency in Martin (2002). 
 
 
6. Advancing the Debate with the Argument from Superficiality 
The Superficiality Constraint is something that relationalists can prima facie accept, 
because, contrary to the Indistinguishability Principle, it allows for introspective 
mistakes about phenomenal character. 
Disjunctivists can explain indistinguishable hallucinations without violating the 
Superficiality Constraint. They can say that something interferes with or disables the 
subject’s introspective capacities. For instance, the subject might not be attentive 
enough, or their brain might not work properly.14 However, it becomes problematic 
when it comes to accommodating the type of hallucinations introduced in the thought 
experiment presented in section 3—hallucinations that are indistinguishable from a 
perception and brought about by the same neural activity. In this thought experiment, 
ex hypothesis, there is no interfering or disabling condition to which disjunctivists can 
appeal to explain why hallucination seems to have a relationalist phenomenal character 
(one that relationally puts us in contact with objects and is constituted by them). It is 
part of the set-up of the thought experiment that the brain activity is identical in the two 
situations, that the subject is employing exactly the same cognitive capacities, is 
 
14 What counts as an interfering or disabling condition for introspection depends in part on how 
we conceive of introspection. The more pluralist one’s account of introspection is (where 
multiple processes and capacities are involved, rather than a single mechanism), the more 
opportunity for disabling and interfering conditions there are. Without committing to any 
specific account of introspection, we can say that, since attention is certainly a crucial 
component of introspection, any factor that may interfere with or disable one’s introspective 
attention counts as a potential disabling or interfering condition. This might be the presence 
of competing stimuli that divert attention (such as overwhelming emotions), altered brain 
states due to illness or drug use, or impaired cognitive capacities. 
 
 
exerting the same degree of attention, and no other occurrence in their stream of 
consciousness interferes with one’s introspective capacities. The only difference 
between a perception and the corresponding perfect hallucination is that the object is 
present in the former case and absent in the latter. But, in order for a condition to 
interfere with introspection, it must be something that is potentially relevant to 
introspection. It is not clear how the mere absence of an object can be relevant to one’s 
introspective capacities. In this respect, introspection is different from perception, and 
the analogy between phenomenal character and observational properties breaks down. 
Perception is sensitive to objects in the world. For this reason, facts about the world 
(e.g. the presence of an occluding object, or of certain lighting conditions) count as 
disabling or interfering conditions for seeing that an object has a certain property. But 
introspection tracks mental occurrences, so it is natural to think that only facts about 
one’s psychological state and the neurological mechanisms that underlie them can 
count as disabling and interfering conditions. 
Thus, disjunctivism seems committed to denying that the phenomenal character of 
these types of hallucination is subject to the Superficiality Constraint. This makes the 
position untenable, as the way we use the notion of phenomenal character in the 
philosophical jargon requires us to accept the Superficiality Constraint. Or so the 
argument goes. 
This argument, which I call ‘argument from superficiality’, only relies on 
unpacking implicit assumptions that are part and parcel of the way the notion of 
‘phenomenal character’ is employed in the philosophical debate. Therefore, it is more 
compelling than the various versions of argument from hallucination, whose key 
assumptions are deemed question-begging by relationalists. 
 
 
Of course there are a number of things disjunctivists can say in response to this 
argument. I don’t claim to have offered a conclusive argument against disjunctivism: 
as we have seen, theories survive their refutations. On the contrary, having identified 
and spelt out the source of the (as of yet implicit) resistance towards the view can give 
disjunctivists the tools to address these worries and win over some opponents, 
especially those who might appreciate the benefits of relationalism but are worried by 
its implications. 
The first option open to relationalists is of course to reject the Superficiality 
Constraint. They might grant that the Superficiality Constraint is constitutive of the way 
most people use the notion of phenomenal character, but they use it differently. What 
they mean by ‘phenomenal character’ is the property of relating the subject to certain 
objects in the environment. If this commits them to violating the Superficiality 
Constraint, then tant pis for superficiality: for them the phenomenal character of an 
experience goes beyond what is accessible through introspection. 
This, however, is not an easy solution. I have argued that the Superficiality 
Constraint doesn’t follow from a particular view of phenomenal character, but rather 
simply from the way we assign the reference of ‘phenomenal character’. There can’t be 
a disagreement about the nature of phenomenal character if we don’t agree on what we 
talk about when we talk about phenomenal character. And if my analysis in the previous 
section was correct, they couldn’t engage in any debate with their opponents about the 
nature of phenomenal character if they were to deny the Superficiality Constraint: they 
would just use the same word to refer to something else entirely. If relationalists 
seriously want to pursue this strategy, they cannot simply reject the superficiality 
constraint, but they have to offer an alternative understanding of the relation between 
 
 
phenomenal character and introspection, one that accommodates our intuitions equally 
well as the Superficiality Constraint. 
Another option is to accept the Superficiality Constraint but avoid the problem it 
poses for hallucinations by arguing that hallucinations don’t have any phenomenal 
character. This is a strategy already adopted by some relationalists (Fish 2009; Dokic 
and Martin 2012; Logue 2012) in response to the traditional argument from 
hallucination. Eliminativism about the phenomenal character of hallucination faces 
several objections, the most compelling of which, in my opinion, is the following. In 
this view, the apparent sensory conscious phenomenology is due to cognitive 
phenomenology (see Fish 2009, 98–9, n. 19). But it is not clear that one can accurately 
account for the (apparent, according to eliminativists) sensory phenomenology of 
hallucinations in terms of cognitive phenomenology (see Vega-Encabo 2010, 190).15 
Additionally, this strategy won’t work, because as long as we concede that it falsely 
seems to a hallucinating subject that they are in a state with phenomenal character, one 
would still violate the superficiality constraint.16 
What seems to me the most promising option for relationalists is to show that their 
view is compatible with the Superficiality Constraint. They could do so by insisting 
that in the hallucinatory case there is something that interferes with one’s introspective 
capacities. The relationalist could insist that, since the object constitutes the 
 
15 As Pautz (2013) notices, the viability of this proposal depends on how satisfactorily one can 
counter traditional arguments against Rosenthal’s ‘higher-order thought theory’ of 
consciousness, on which Fish’s idea that consciousness of hallucination is a by-product of 
cognitive attitudes heavily relies. 
16 Thanks to Heather Logue for pointing this out to me. 
 
 
phenomenal character of one’s veridical perception, and this is something one can 
introspect, the lack of the object that seems to constitute the phenomenal character of 
hallucination is relevant to introspection. 
Interestingly, some relationalists have proposed theories of introspection that could 
support such a claim. The most developed theory of introspection of this kind I am 
aware of is proposed by Soteriou (2013, ch. 8). He argues that introspection works by 
focusing one’s attention on the object of perception by focusing on how they 
subjectively strike us: introspection is then structurally parasitical on perception. So the 
mere fact that in introspection one fails to be in the perceptual relation to the world one 
takes herself to be is enough to impair one’s ability to introspect properly and access 
the real phenomenal character of perfect hallucination.17 
There are certainly more things relationalists could say to try and accommodate 
the Superficiality Constraint or to replace it with a less problematic specification of the 
relation between phenomenal character and introspection. Exploring their options will 
in any case lead to a better understanding of their commitments and will offer new 
elements to help us decide whether the costs of accepting disjunctivism exceed its 
benefits. What’s noteworthy is that trying to deny the Superficiality Constraint and 
trying to accommodate it seem to both depend on a clarification of what relationalists 
take introspection of the phenomenal character to be. This suggests that the main 
disagreement between relationalists and their opponents may lie in how they 
 
17 It seems to me that a view of introspection along these lines plays a central role in much of 
the arguments for disjunctivism in Martin (2006). A similar theory has been proposed by 
Logue (2012), who pairs it with a commitment to eliminativism about the phenomenal 
character of hallucination. 
 
 
respectively understand introspection and that the focus of the debate should shift in 
that direction. 
Fish identifies a lack of progress in the debate, and attributes it to a structural (and, 
as such, insurmountable) problem: the incommensurability of the paradigms adopted 
by proponents of alternative views. Instead, I have argued that the current stall is due 
to specific shortcomings—in particular, failing to acknowledge, from both sides of the 
debate, the deep-seated intuition that underlies the rejection of disjunctivism (i.e. the 
Superficiality Constraint). This diagnosis of the debate is preferable because it makes 
space for the possibility of adjudicating the debate and offers some suggestion as to 
what could tip the scale one way or another.18 
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